

1st ESEI Market Design Workshop at CERGE-EI

Oct 11-13, 2012, Prague

Thursday, October 11

Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

- The US Incentive Auctions

Friday, October 12

Session I: Mechanism Design: Theory and Applications

Paul Klemperer (Oxford University)

- The Bank of England's Product-Mix Auction

Elizabeth Baldwin and Paul Klemperer (Oxford University)

- Tropical Geometry, Product-Mix Auctions, and the Analysis of Demand

Jacob Goeree (University of Zurich)

- A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design

Fabio Michelucci (CERGE-EI)

- The English Auction, Rushes, and a Sealed Bid Efficient Auction

Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

- Auctions, Adverse Selection and Internet Display Advertising

Session II: Matching

Lars Ehlers (University of Montreal)

- School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds

Flip Klijn (IAE-CSIC)

- Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

Dorothea Kuebler (WZB)

- Implementing Quotas in University Admissions

Estelle Cantillon (ECARES)

- Endogenous Preferences in School Choice

Saturday, October 13

Session III: Markets and Experiments

John Wooders (University of Technology Sydney)

- Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention

Luke Lindsay (University of Zurich)

- Designing Package Markets to Eliminate Exposure Risk

Jingjing Zhang (University of Zurich)

- Electoral Engineering: One Man, One Bid

Sean Crockett (Baruch College)

- In the Long Run We All Trade: Reference Dependence in Dynamic Economies

Peter Katuščák (CERGEI-EI)

- Does Feedback Really Matter? If so, why, and for whom? Evidence from the FPA

Session IV: Auctions

Philippe Jehiel (UCL and Paris School of Economics)

- Absolute Auctions and Secret Reserve Prices: Why Are They Used?

Konrad Mierendorff (University of Zurich)

- Auctions under limited Commitment

Nenad Kos (Bocconi University)

- Information in Tender Offers with a Large Shareholder

Emel Filiz-Ozbay (University of Maryland)

- An Experiment on Auctions with Endogenous Budget Constraint